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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW QUARTERY
and THE BAR
VOLum XLIII DECEmBER, 1936 NumBER 1
THE PROBLEM OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS*
HAYMOND MAXwIt.,*
The question of instructions to juries is a perennial problem
with practitioners and judges. Having in mind the seriousness of
this subject, the Judicial Council of West Virginia, some months
ago, formulated a program for thorough investigation and con-
sideration of the instructions enigma. In response to the council's
request that it render assistance in the matter, the faculty of the
College of Law of West Virginia University caused to be made
a synopsis of all the state statutes dealing with instructions. Only
a few of the states have no such statutes. Virginia is among that
small number.
Though I am no longer a member of the Judicial Council, my
interest having been aroused in this important procedural matter
by the discussions which took place in the council, I have made some
investigation of the subject within recent weeks.
Logically, the initial inquiry should be directed to the extent
of the seriousness of the problem. First: Within what measure
does the giving of erroneous instructions or the refusal of correct
instructions contribute to the reversal of cases? Second: Does the
giving of instructions under the present system actually assist
juries in the rightful determination of cases? To this latter
inquiry, perhaps the correct composite answer is this: If the in-
struction or charge is clear and concise and not voluminous, the
jury is thereby substantially assisted, but prolixity, volubility, and
multiplicity necessarily tend to confusion. Sometimes instructions
An address delivered at the fifty-second annual meeting of the West Vir-
ginia Bar Association in Wheeling, West Virginia, on October 9, 1936.
** Member of the Supreme Court of Appeals, Charleston, West Virginia.
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2 THE PROBLEM OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
are tendered almost en masse. Under present law, all instructions
offered, if technically correct and not repetitious, must be read by
the court to the jury unless the court embodies them substantially
in a charge. The query therefore arises whether this is a whole-
some situation.
It is not my purpose in this discussion to attempt to advocate
particular views, or to urge reform. I am simply endeavoring to
state the facts of the case as a basis for study.
It is not infrequently considered that the matter of in-
structions in jury cases is a prolific source of prejudicial and there-
fore reversible error. The situation is relative. On a statistical
basis, there may be room for difference of opinion as to the serious-
ness of the problem. Examination of Volumes 108-116, inclusive,
of the West Virginia Supreme Court Reports, reveals these facts:
In civil jury cases reversed, thirteen and eight-tenths per
centum of the reversals were in whole or in part on account
of instructions. Consideration of the reported opinions of the
criminal jury cases in the same nine volumvs discloses that in-
structions contributed to or controlled the reversals of seventeen
per centum of such cases. To clinch the thought in round numbers,
the civil reversals on account of instructions were one in seven,
and the criminal, one in six.
I propound attendant queries, but do not undertake to answer
them. (1) Are these percentages, in both civil and criminal cases,
higher than they ought to be in the proper administration of
justice under the jury system? (2) If so, what change in our
method of instructing juries would tend to correct the situation?
With the foregoing survey of actual results in cases reviewed
by the Supreme Court of Appeals as a background for the
development of our thesis, let us turn attention primarily to the
law controlling the West Virginia procedure.
West Virginia's first statute in respect of instructions to
juries was Chapter 38 of the Acts of the Legislature of 1907.
Prior thereto, the common law obtained in this state. The rule of
the common law is thus stated by Blackstone:
"When the evidence is gone through on both sides, the
judge, in the presence of the parties, the counsel, and all
others, sums up the whole to the jury; omitting all superfluous
circumstances, observing wherein the main question and prin-
cipal issue lies, stating what evidence has been given to sup-
port it, with such remarks as he thinks necessary for their
2
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direction, and giving them his opinion in matters of law
arising upon that evidence."'
The practice in West Virginia prior to 1907 seems not to have
been uniform in all of the circuits, though, according. to the in-
formation which I have received, the trial judges, as a general
rule, required instructions to be tendered in writing by counsel.
From several gentlemen who have personal knowledge of the
events, I have received the information that the statute of 1907 re-
quiring that "all of the instructions of the court to the jury shall
be plainly written in longhand or typewritten before given to the
jury by the court and not changed in any way thereafter," was
enacted because of the recalcitrant attitude of one of the circuit
judges. It is narrated that he would have much to say to a jury
but that the lawyers would have great difficulty in, obtaining from
him bills of exception which correctly set forth what had been
stated to the jury. Undoubtedly, as the law then stood, a trial
judge could with all propriety, instruct the jury orally, on his own
motion or on motion of counsel.
Inquiries recently made of several of the senior members of
the West Virginia bar have brought forth the information on
which is based the foregoing statement that instructions were or-
dinarily in writing; further, that some judges would occasionally
instruct orally as to burden of proof and upon other more or less
stereotyped matters; sometimes, more elaborate and involved mat-
ters were also orally instructed upon. In some of the circuits, oral
instructions were more frequent than in others. In several circuits,
there was no designated time when the instructions were to be given
nor who should read them. Some of the judges, after they had
passed on the instructions, would have opposing attorneys read
their own instructions to the jury.
It is interesting to note from communications received from
senior brethren, to whom inquiry on the subject was addressed,
that their impressions of the merits of the prior and present prac-
tices differ widely. The following excerpts from different letters
illustrate the point. One eminent gentleman wrote with respect to
the 1907 Act:
"I felt at the time that it was unfortunate to have such
a law passed. My view has always been that the judge should
have the power to see that the jury was properly informed of
13 BL. Comm. 375.
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4 THE PROBLEM OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
the law governing the case before it, and with the proper kind
of a judge, there would be no abuse of such a privilege and
right, and I felt that it was wrong to take away from the ma-jority of the courts of the State this power, because it was being
abused by some one or more judges."
On the other hand, another distinguished practitioner wrote:
"During the trial and giving of instructions attorneys
often complained of the remarks of Judges and the manner in
which they would give and interpret the instructions. The
remarks and interpretations would not be. written and it was
difficult to take exceptions to what the Judges had said and
done so as to use the same in a writ of error. There was much
complaint by many lawyers over the State about the arbitrary
disposition and rulings of the Courts. Much more in some
Circuits than others.... May I say that I am of the opinion
that this statute (1907) and the Acts of 1915 which extended
and improved the 1907 Act was a progressive step in our prac-
tice and fairly well limits the instructions and what is said to
the jury concerning them to the record, so that any part and
all of it can be reviewed upon writ of error. I believe, that a
number of lawyers practicing in the Federal Courts would be
pleased to have a similar proceeding to govern them."
In respect of the whole matter, another gentleman of wide
experience both as a judge and as a lawyer, has this to say:
"Our present method of giving instructions to juries is
in many instances a farce. I have often talked to juries after
they have returned a verdict about the instructions andj found
that in many cases, they did not understand the instructions
and paid no attention to them. If, after the evidence has been
introduced, our courts were authorized to deliver to the juries
in plain language a charge dealing with the issues ikaised, I
am firmly confident that juries would be able to return more
intelligent verdicts than they usually do. I know in one meet-
ing of the Judges of the State to consider thig question, it was
stated by a Judge that he had had as many as a hundred writ-
ten instructions prepared by the attorneys passed up to him
which he had to go over and inspect before the argument. I,
when on the bench, never had this many instructions handed
me for consideration, but on many occasions have had to delay
the trial and the argument while I considered as many as
twenty-five typewritten requests for instructions before allow-
ing the argument to begin. As you know, instructions are
very often prepared by counsel not for the purpose of assist-
ing the jury, but rather to get error in the record. If we
required our trial Judges to instruct juries, the practice would
develop the Judge. He would become, as they do in other
states, skilled in the practice of preparing charges and in-
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1936], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol43/iss1/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY 5
structions and soon be able to deliver to the jury succinct and
plainly written instructions that the jury would understand
and be guided thereby. We will admit that this practice, when
first adopted, would no doubt be a source of error, but this
would soon be corrected, and, at any rate, conditions could be
no worse than they are now... I sincerely hope that a
change will be made in this practice, which will permit our
Judges to assume the dignity equalling the dignity of the
Judges of other states."
In pondering this voluminous and complex equation, and in
undertaking to determine whether the West Virginia practice in
respect of instructions to juries is what it ought to be, or whether
it should be changed, we come now to consider the existing West
Virginia statute on the subject together with the applicable rule
of practice promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals, April
10, 1936.
In substance, the statute provides 2 that the court may give to
the jury instructions prepared by either party, submitted by him
to the opposing party, and then presented to the court, provided
they are not covered in substance by other instructions; that
in lieu of giving separate instructions, the court may, in writing,
charge the jury upon the law governing the case, putting the
proper instructions tendered by the parties in an orderly and con-
nected charge incorporating therein the substance and, so far as
may be, the language of the instructions prayed for upon either
side or prepared by the court on its own motion, which writ-
ten charge shall first be submitted to counsel on each side with op-
portunit to object to any part thereof. All instructions shall be
read by the court to the jury as the action of the court, without
disclosing the party by whom they were tendered. Each instruction
tendered shall be plainly marked by the court as to its action with
respect thereto. All instructions tendered, whether given or not,
with notations thereon, shall constitute a part of the record, with-
out the formality of a bill of exceptions embracing the same. It is
further provided by the statute that its inhibitions shall not be
deemed to affect the power of the court to instruct the jury orally
concerning matters not proper for their consideration or concern-
ing the conduct of any person in connection with the trial.
The statute does not prescribe whether the court's instructions or
charge shall be read to the jury before or after argument of counsel.
2The statutory provisions are found in W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art.
6, §§ 19, 20, 21, 22.
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The pertinent provision of the rules of procedure and practice
for trial courts, promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals a
few months ago, reads as follows:
"All instructions to juries shall be reduced to writing
and a copy presented to opposing counsel at the conclusion of
the evidence. The Court will instruct the jury prior to argu-
ment. Supplementary instructions may be given later. Ob-
jections, if any, to each instruction shall be made when the
same is offered; specific grounds of objection only will be con-
sidered. Exceptions to the refusal to grant or to granting the
same or to modified instructions shall be made at the time, or
the same shall be deemed to be waived. Counsel may comment
upon the instructions in their argument, but may not read the
instructions to the jury, but the Court in its discretion may
reread one or more of the instructions. Counsel may not argue
against the correctness of any instruction, nor comment upon
any evidence ruled out, nor misquote the evidence, nor make
statements of fact dehors the record, nor contend before the
jury for any theory of the case that has been overruled. Coun-
sel shall not be interrupted in argument by opposing counsel,
except as may be necessary to bring to the Court's attention
objection to any statement to the jury made by opposing
counsel, and obtain a ruling on such objection. No portion of
a law book shall be read to the jury by counsel."
For the purpose of obtaining further information apropos of
the problem whether our present practice with respect to instruc-
tions is what it should be, and, if not, what changes should
be made, reference should be had to the procedure obtaining in the
federal courts, and in the courts of sister states.
The federal rule is familiar to all lawyers. It is thus'stated:
"The judge may comment upon the facts, provided that,
when the evidence is conflicting, he makes it clear to the jury
that they are not bound by his opinion." 1 3
Further, it is stated in Simkins' Federal Practic64 that where
the general charge substantially covers the case the judge may re-
fuse special instructions, otherwise it is error to refuse such in-
structions which correctly propound the law. Points to be covered
in an oral charge may be specifically requested by counsel. Instruc-
tions in federal practice are given after argument, and if there be
objection to any portion of an oral charge, such objection must be
made known to the court before the jury retires to consider the
case.
3 3 FosTER, FEDERAL PRAcTI:E (6th ed. 1920) § 473j.
4 SIMKINS, FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1934) § 175.
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In response to recent inquiries of Virginia lawyers the in-
formation has been received that the Virginia courts have never
adopted the English practice of charging the jury, or summing up
as it is sometimes denominated. In Virginia, written instructions
have been employed since the early days of the commonwealth. The
courts also instruct orally, as occasion may require. In the very
recent case of Drinkard v. Commonwealth,5 the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia said:
"The recognized practice in this State is for the court to
give written instructions requested by the litigants, when
satisfied that they correctly state the law applicable to the evi-
dence, and to give oral instructions only in the event such in-
structions are requested or to clarify a general statement
contained in the written instruction."
The statutes of the several states, reported by the law faculty
to the judicial council a few months ago, are so variant that it is
almost impossible to make a satisfactory analysis thereof within a
brief compass.
The North Carolina statute provides that a trial judge shall
not express any opinion whether a fact is fully or sufficiently
proven, that being the true office and province of the jury; but he
shall state in plain and correct manner the evidence given in the
case and declare and explain the law arising thereon. At the re-
quest of a party, the charge shall be reduced to writing, and read
to the jury.
About three-fourths of the states have statutes providing for
the giving of a charge by the court to the jury. In addition to the
authorization that the court propound the principles of law ap-
plicable, a few of the states provide that the charge may contain a
statement of the evidence, upon the condition, however, that the
judge make it plain to the jury that his views of the evidence need
not be controlling. Some of the states in this large group make no
provision for instructions tendered by the parties; others provide
for such instructions, while a number provide only for requests by
parties as to matter to be incorporated in the charge. Of the prac-
tice in an extensive number of stated there may safely be made the
generalization that much more emphasis is placed on charges by
the court than on instructions tendered by the parties.
Many of the states require that the charge be in writing at
the time it is given to the jury, or if made orally, it must be
5 165 Va. 799, 183 S. E. 251 (1936).
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transcribed by the court stenographer and preserved as part of the
record. In states which admit of oral charges, upon request of
either party the charge must be taken down by the court reporter
and signed by the judge.
Some of the statutes permit the court's charge to be supple-
mented upon the request of parties. In such instance, either party
may tender in writing to the court additional points to be included
in the charge or to be given specially to the jury. The court
may give or refuse such additional requests as would seem proper
and indicate his decision thereon in the manner most commonly
employed in ruling upon written instructions.
As to the time of giving the charge, the statutes are at vari-
ance. Some specify that it shall be given before argument, others
after argument. A few states provide that written charges may be
taken by the jury upon retirement; that the charge may be reread
by counsel in argument to the jury; that the parties may waive
making the charge a part of the record.
A number of the states having statutes treating of the subject
of charges to the jury, have provisions governing instructions. And
though adopting a few general principles applicable to both, for
the most part the statutes place instructions in a distinctly separate
category from that of the charge.
Some of the provisions dealing with instructions are these:
First, that instructions to juries shall be in writing. Second, that
the'court shalZl either give or refuse instructions as tendered by the
parties, or may give, modify or refuse the same. Third, that in-
structions given may be taken by the jury upon retirement. Fourth,
that after retirement, the jury may request further instructions.
Fifth, that instructions constitute part of the record in the case.
Many of the statutes are conspicuous in the generality of the
treatment of the procedural steps in instructing juries, but a few
of the statutes descend to great particularity. Typical of the latter
group, are the statutes which treat of the time and mode of giving
instructions; objections and exceptions thereto; presentation;
ruling and indorsement by the court; and 'additional instructions.
In the latter group, there are those which provide that instructions
(written) be tendered by the parties at an early stage of the trial;
that there be settlement of the instructions so tendered, giving the
parties opportunity to state their objections and exceptions there-
to and be heard in argument thereon. Extended minutia of pro-
cedure appears in many of the statutes.
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Some of the statutes, whether dealing with charges or instruc-
tions, differentiate as to civil and criminal cases. In this dis-
cussion, no attempt has been made to segregate them in respect of
their applicability to the particular kind of action.
The problem of instructions to juries dovetails with the
question whether, as a general rule, juries should be required to
return general verdicts, as in West Virginia, or whether they
should only make specific findings of fact, the courts to render
judgment on the facts as determined. Such innovation, of course,
would solve the difficulties relating to instructions.
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